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In the face of the critical economic situation through 
which most of the countries of Latin America are 
passing, the author presents his interpretation of this 
and outlines the measures which should be taken to 
deal with it. 
Right from the start he recognizes the existence 
of serious conjunctival problems —such as the re-
duction in the economic growth rate, the high rate of 
unemployment , the deterioration of the terms of 
trade, the high level of external indebtedness, etc.— 
which call for the application of a rapid and effective 
short-term policy, whose principal measures he out-
l ines . H e emphasizes, however, that behind these 
conjunctural problems are profound and serious 
structural imbalances, so that the conjuncture! policy 
must not b e viewed as something isolated, but as the 
starting point of a structural development policy. 
T h e present crisis has brought to the fore once' 
again both the external imbalance and its tendency 
to choke development, and the internal imbalance, 
the exclusive and conflictive consequences of which 
are reflected above all in the inability to absorb the 
ent i re labour force in a productive manner, and in 
social inflation. 
T o deal with the external imbalance, he sug-
gests basically that industrialization should be pro-
moted within a regional framework in order to sur-
mount the limits of national markets and the serious 
restrictions resulting from the present relationship 
with the centres. In order to overcome the internal 
imbalance, he emphasizes that the problems of ac-
cumulation, redistribution and inflation inevitably 
call for the macroeconomic regulation of the surplus: 
the cost of the crisis and of the reactivation must be 
spread out in an equitable manner, and the labour 
force must share in the surplus and in the responsi-
bility for accumulation. 
•Director, CEPAL Review. 
I 
The swinging pendulum 
of development policy 
The crisis of capitalism in the centres is spread-
ing to cover the whole world, and its adverse 
effects are clearly visible on the periphery, 
where it is aggravating the disturbances which 
had already been occurring in that area's own 
development. 
We are now at a crucial and historic turning 
point, as at the time of the Great Depression. At 
that time, by the force of circumstances, we had 
to follow our own road to development, but we 
departed from that great undertaking during 
the long boom years of the centres, which came 
to an end in the first half of the 1970s. 
We Latin Americans should wake up to the 
facts. The centres are simply not interested in 
our achieving a socially satisfactory form of 
development. Our development only concerns 
them inasmuch as it affects their own develop-
ment. It goes without saying, however, that the 
centres have great significance for us because 
of our technological and capital exchanges with 
them. The great problem lies in taking advan-
tage of all this in a rational and independent 
manner. 
This limited interest on the part of the 
centres is a consequences of their centripetal 
dynamics rather than of any ill intent. At all 
events, it is essential for us to continue the by 
no means easy quest for our own road to devel-
opment. 
When we set out along this road before, we 
had both success and failures. We did not fully 
recognize the structural obstacles, and much 
less the need for great changes, and in order to 
correct these errors we frequently committed 
others in the opposite direction. In reality, we 
were moving like a pendulum. 
In this transition from one swing of the 
pendulum to another there has been a great 
deal of ideological influence. The slow and 
precarious process of freeing ourselves from 
theories alien to our own reality which we 
began in the Great Depression gave way in 
more recent times to opposite concepts whose 
results are already beginning to be all too 
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clear. Let us look at the most important of 
these: 
—Although development has been vigor-
ous, it has not been equitable. There have been 
great disparities in the structural distribution of 
income, and the economic efficiency of the 
market has not been accompanied by social 
efficiency. In the course of our development, 
attempts have been made to correct these dis-
parities in the labour force's share in the fruits 
of development through labour's exertion of its 
trade union and political power and through 
State spending. Because of the nature of the 
system, private and social consumption have 
indeed been increased in this way, but not at 
the expense of the privileged consumption 
which the upper strata enjoy because of their 
power. Instead, this has taken place to the det-
riment of the rate of accumulation of the repro-
ductive capital which serves to multiply em-
ployment and productivity. This imbalance be-
tween the rate of consumption and the rate of 
accumulation inevitably leads to social in-
flation. 
Neither the market forces —which are of 
great significance in the efficiency of the sys-
tem— nor the distributive struggle arising from 
the power play have imparted social efficiency 
to the system, nor indeed could they ever do so. 
They have not shown themselves to be suitable 
mechanisms of distributive equity. In order to 
achieve the latter it is essential that the State 
should exercise its regulatory action in a man-
ner compatible with individual enterprise, 
competition and the procesq of democratiz-
ation. 
A clear and vigorous policy of redistribu-
tion and dynamic promotion is called for, but 
we have lost our way as regards the means, 
although not as regards the ends pursued. 
We cannot and did not close our eyes to 
such errors. In our desire to correct them, how-
ever, we have fallen into opposite errors: ham-
stringing the trade union and political power of 
the labour force and dismantling the machinery 
of the State. And by seeking to attack social 
inflation through monetary approaches we 
have simply caused economic contraction and 
unemployment. 
— The State bears a fundamental respon-
sibility in development which it has not been 
able to fulfil properly, possibly because of its 
own tendency towards excessive growth, due 
above all to its attempt to correct the social 
inadequacy of development. Inflation and ex-
ternal vulnerability have also caused it to inter-
vene where it should not have done so, with 
negative results. 
— For a considerable time past there has 
been growing recognition of the need for en-
lightened regulation of the banking system, as 
the essential instrument of monetary policy. 
Inflation has adversely affected and compli-
cated this regulatory actiony and the pendulum 
has swung to the other extreme, so that the 
importance of this action has been rejected in 
favour of total banking liberty, that is to say, 
freedom to create money without observing 
the most elementary rules of discipline, and to 
the serious prejudice of financial solvency. 
— This exaggerated liberty also extended 
to external operations, and here too there was a 
swing of the pendulum. We rightly complained 
in the past about the IMF, which we acused of 
applying a set of technocratic rules in whose 
formulation the periphery had not been given 
any opportunity to participate, and the same 
complaints were levelled against the criteria of 
the World Bank: two organizations of States 
whose duty is to make loans mainly to States. 
On the pretext of the free play of the laws of the 
market in the international field, however, big 
private institutions rapidly developed their 
Eurocurrency operations, thus largely dis-
placing these two organizations. Private enter-
prise, it was repeatedly argued, knew best how 
to make wise use of international financial re-
sources, and the incentive of massive gains 
prevailed over prudence and good sense, in a 
process of mutual harmonization of immediate 
interest in both the centre and the periphery. 
The consequences of this swing of the pendu-
lum are clearly to be seen. 
— The Great Depression and its pro-
longed aftermath brought home to us the un-
avoidable need to industrialize. In a world 
economy shrunken and fragmented by the de-
pression it was essential to embark on import 
substitution, and this somewhat unbalanced 
solution came to be a veritable dogma of devel-
opment, so that we neglected our exports and 
sometimes even hindered them. We continued 
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in this way until, with the recovery and re-
opening of the world economy, opportunities 
arose for the export of manufactures, particular-
ly in the long years of prosperity of the centres. 
We finally learned to do so with such success 
that the pendulum rapidly swung to the other 
extreme and we looked down on substitution 
policies: now, development must be promoted 
on the basis of the powerful motive force of free 
trade. However, we were not able to achieve a 
balanced combination of import substitution 
with the export of manufactures. If we had 
done so we would now be able to face up better 
to the external vulnerability of our peripheral 
economies. 
Are we going to continue indefinitely with 
this to-and-fro movement? What is involved is 
not, of course, the search for a golden mean, but 
the need to make fundamental changes aimed 
at correcting the great structural imbalances of 
our development: the imbalance with the 
centres, with the tendency towards an external 
bottleneck choking development, and the in-
ternal imbalance which is responsible both for 
A distinction should be drawn right away be-
tween conjunctural and structural phenomena: 
this is a useful practical distinction, provided 
that we do not lose sight of the fact that conjunc-
tural phenomena are almost always the result of 
structural imbalances. Thus, the adverse con-
juctural effects of monetary policy stem ulti-
mately from the structural faults in the system 
or, to be more exact, from the structural imbal-
ances which occur in the course of develop-
ment and the changes which take place in the 
power structure. 
The correction of these structural imbal-
ances is not something which can have imme-
diate effects, but takes a certain amount of time. 
Indeed, there is by no means general agree-
ment on the interpretation of these imbalances, 
especially as regards the imbalance between 
the rate of consumption and the rate of accumu-
the exclusive tendency of the system, with its 
inability to provide productive employment for 
the great masses relegated to the bottom of the 
social structure, and for the conflictive tenden-
cy in the distribution of the fruits of develop-
ment which gives rise to the grave problem of 
social inflation. 
The consequences of these imbalances are 
combined with cyclical or conjunctural move-
ments which generally arise from them, as the 
cycle is the characteristic form of evolution of 
the capitalist economy. This gives rise to intri-
cate phenomena which are both structural and 
conjuctural at the same time, as we are witnes-
sing now, when the serious decline in the 
growth rate of the centres is having troubling 
repercussions on the periphery which aggra-
vate the effects of our own actions. 
The following chapter will be devoted to 
this latter point, after which we shall deal with 
structural imbalances. The ultimate aim of all 
this is to reflect on the right road to follow in the 
development of the periphery. 
lation on the periphery. These phenomena 
could hardly be tackled, then, without first of 
all trying to clarify and explain them.1 
However, the presence of structural phe-
nomena does not justify the relegation to a 
lower level of priority of the need for a conjunc-
tural policy. At the same time, the most impor-
tant measures involved in such conjunctural 
policy should not run counter to those which 
would have to be followed in a policy of struc-
iFrom the very first days of CEPAL it was stressed that 
the tendency to structural imbalance in the relations with 
the centres could not be corrected through the simple play 
of the laws of the market, and it was also noted that there 
were structural elements in inflation which, it was main-
tained, could not be combated with monetary measures. 
We were a little longer, however, in realizing that the inner 
logic of the system inevitably tends towards crisis, through 
its own dynamics. 
II 
Conjuctural policy 
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rural changes, which, by their very nature, 
would have to be of a long-term nature. In the 
final analysis, the long term has its starting 
point in the present. 
We now propose to engage in a brief dis-
cussion of the main elements of a conjunctural 
policy, its possibilities and its limitations. 
These are short-term possibilities, of course. 
Beyond them lie the limitations of a structural 
nature, the gradual reduction of which calls for 
a longer space of time. This latter element cor-
responds to structural development policy. 
Of course the centres also have serious 
conjunctural problems arising from their own 
structural crises, the solution of which would 
reduce the seriousness of their repercussions 
on the periphery. 
Let us now analyse the incidence of this 
crisis and its conjunctural consequences on the 
Latin American periphery. This crisis is mani-
fested in very different aspects: 
— There has been a sharp reduction in the 
extraordinary growth rate which the centres 
had previously achieved. The adverse effect of 
this on the growth rate of the exports of the 
periphery, together with the resurgence of 
protectionism, are aggravated by the deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade, accentuated by the 
rise in oil prices. 
— These phenomena which are so ad-
verse to the periphery have brought with them 
a considerable decline in the latter's rate of 
development, with a consequent drop in em-
ployment and income, all of which has brought 
about a conjunctural aggravation of the exclu-
sive and conflictive tendencies of the system. 
— The objective of correcting the fiscal 
deficit through extraordinary rises in interest 
rates has not only aggravated the effect of the 
structural crisis of the centres on the employ-
ment situation but has also helped to bring 
about a sharp rise in the already excessive bur-
den of Eurocurrency credits on the countries of 
the periphery. 
The IMF and the World Bank did not chan-
nel to the latter the floating assets from the 
Eurocurrency market, coming largely from the 
oil surpluses, in order to organize a sound and 
effective flow of resources to the periphery. It 
was the international private banking system 
which carried out this task, for which it was not 
prepared, while the advanced countries man-
aged to attract huge investments of the oil sur-
pluses. Moreover, there has only been very 
scanty realization of the hopes that the oil-ex-
porting countries would invest a growing pro-
portion of their surplus resources in the devel-
opment of the Third World. 
— The decline in these surpluses, the high 
rates of interest, and the adverse consequences 
of the crisis in the centres are now revealingthe 
serious effects of this imprudent indebtedness 
on the part of the periphery, only part of which 
has gone into reproductive investments. 
Although the incidence of these events has 
been very unequal in the different countries of 
Latin America, all of them are suffering as re-
gards the growth rate of their exports and the 
internal consequences, and all of them—albeit 
in different ways and to different extents— 
have to defend themselves with conjunctural 
measures. A distinction must be drawn, how-
ever, between the oil-exporting countries and 
the other countries of Latin America. 
Let us consider the first of these. The 
abundant oil resources generated veritable 
euphoria, both at the State level and in private 
activity. They gave rise to very easy availability 
of credit, the expansive effects of which were 
accentuated by the flow of Eurodollar re-
sources, and there was a very sharp upswing in 
economic activity and employment, above all 
in construction and various services not con-
nected with the exterior, but at the same time 
the overvaluation of the currency adversely 
affected exports and import substitution ac-
tivities. 
In the case of the other countries, whose 
exports suffered the consequences of the crisis 
inasmuch as imports and interest rates went up, 
the increased inflow of external resources 
stimulated by the rise in domestic interest rates 
did not serve so much to improve domestic 
activities as merely to lessen somewhat these 
adverse effects. With the same objective of 
combating the latter, credit restriction mea-
sures were also sometimes imposed (to which 
we shall refer in the following chapter), the 
effect of which was to accentuate the economic 
contraction and unemployment, especially 
when it was sought to combat the domestic 
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consequences of inflation through overvalua-
tion of the currency. 
A conjunctural policy is therefore essential 
in order to face up to these problems, in view of 
the big differences between the countries and 
the degree of restriction inherent in their struc-
tural imbalances. 
The starting point for all this must be the 
reactivation of the economy, which has two 
main aspects, namely, its domestic inflationary 
effects and its consequences on the balance of 
payments. 
Above all; it is necessary to encourage 
enterprises to expand their production. This 
requires an increase in demand in order to give 
an initial impulse to the production mecha-
nism, either by raising wages, when these have 
suffered serious deterioration, or through other 
promotional measures, in addition to the 
effects of increased exports and the adjustment 
of imports. 
Very little can be achieved without sharply 
reducing the present exorbitant interest rates at 
least down to the international level. The risk 
that such a reduction and the easing of credit 
may stimulate the flight of capital to the exte-
rior is of course a matter of great concern. We 
are thus faced with a very difficult option as 
regards conjunctural policy, particularly in 
the period of transition: either the outflow of 
funds to the exterior must be temporarily con-
trolled, which is a very difficult and frustra-
ting matter, especially when there is no bank-
ing discipline, or else the contraction of the 
economy and the rise in unemployment will 
continue with increasingly serious economic 
and social effects. 
There is also the problem of the unpaid 
debts to the banking system due both to these 
high interest rates and to the serious state of the 
economy. This is not merely a question of iso-
lated enterprises, which could go into liquida-
tion without causing serious disturbances, but 
affects a considerable number of firms. A gen-
eral wave of liquidation which would also 
shake the stability of banks and depositors is 
out of the question. It will readily be under-
stood that if this problem is not solved, the 
reactivation policy will have very little effect. It 
is largely a question of stretching repayment 
terms and lowering interest rates: a problem 
which is inherently very difficult not only be-
cause of the almost inevitable bankruptcies but 
also because of the need to spread out their 
effects in an equitable manner. 
What inflationary effects could the expan-
sion of credit bring with it? No matter how 
much idle capacity there may be in the econ-
omy, it would be impossible to avoid some rises 
in prices as employment recovers. Indeed, it is 
even desirable that this should take place up to 
a level which enables the economic surplus to 
be restored, and with it the potential for the 
accumulation of reproductive capital which 
will make it possible to set about the solution of 
certain structural problems. If this rise in prices 
is followed —above all if it has been necessary 
to devalue the currency— by a corrective ad-
justment of wages, however, the resulting infla-
tionary spiral would seriously compromise the 
success of the reactivation policy. 
This is a matter whose importance should 
not be overlooked. Here we encounter the 
question of the economic surplus once again. 
We already explained in another study why the 
continuous growth of this surplus is of great 
importance for the growth of the economy. A 
clear distinction must be drawn, however, be-
tween this dynamic significance of the surplus 
and its appropriation. This raises some very 
serious queries. Is the surplus going to be in-
creased in order to restore and increase the 
privilege consumption of the upper strata as 
well as their capital accumulation? Will the 
accumulation continue to take place for their 
benefit? And would it be socially and political-
ly acceptable to keep down the wages of the 
labour force in spite of the rise in prices so that 
the surplus can grow on such terms? 
Getting to the bottom of the problem of the 
social use of the surplus is a very intricate and 
difficult matter which cannot be lightly impro-
vised in the face of the urgent need for a reacti-
vation policy. The immediate containment of 
wages in order to reduce or avoid the inflation-
ary spiral would have to be compensated, how-
ever, with some form of participation of the 
labour force in the growth of the surplus, not 
only in order to increase its inadequate con-
sumption but also in order to enable it to share 
in accumulation. All this must take place at the 
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expense of the consumption of the privileged 
strata. 
In this way, it would become possible to 
reduce the inflationary effect of increased 
wages on costs and prices. Of course the reduc-
tion of interest rates would also have this effect 
by compensating to some extent for the reper-
cussions of wage increases, as would the reduc-
tion in costs made possible by better utilization 
of production capacity. 
There is usually a great deal of talk in mis 
respect about income policy. The results of this 
would be very precarious, however, if the la-
bour force were not made to participate in one 
way or another in the growth of the surplus. 
The same could be said of price controls, to 
which temporary recourse could be had in acute 
cases, although this could run counter to the 
need to restore the surplus. 
Concern about combating inflation now 
brings me to the question of the fiscal deficit. 
The application of drastic measures would en-
able this to be reduced or eliminated, although 
they might at the same time cause or aggravate 
unemployment. On the other hand, it would be 
a very serious matter to add the expansion of 
credit for the purposes of reactivation to such a 
deficit. In undertaking such expansion, it would 
therefore be necessary to increase taxes and 
reduce expenditure in proportion as the econ-
omy is reactivated. 
From the external point of view, the expan-
sion of credit would bring with it an increase in 
imports, thus accentuating or provoking an 
external imbalance. Of course, where over-
valuation of the currency had been corrected, 
the immediate effects of this would be favour-
able, but if the circumstances call for a very 
sharp reduction in imports, as might happen in 
certain cases, especially when the burden of oil 
imports is very heavy, perhaps this would not 
be sufficient, even if prudent use were made of 
the monetary reserves or external credits. It 
would therefore be necessary to apply severely 
selective measures through emergency taxes, 
rather than resorting to rationing, with its dis-
turbing effects. All this should be accompanied 
by measures aimed at giving a strong stimulus 
to exports. I do not believe that currency deva-
luation should be resorted to for this purpose. 
In this respect, it is necessary to distin-
guish between two types of devaluation. There 
is one kind which must inevitably be applied 
—and the sooner the better— in order to bring 
the exchange rate in line with domestic infla-
tion. The other type of devaluation is that re-
sorted to as a means of securing external equi-
librium, and this type is not advisable, for rea-
sons which I shall set forth elsewhere. 
We have spoken of the domestic and ex-
ternal possibilities and limitations of a conjunc-
tural policy. We have noted that it is indispens-
able in order to increase employment and re-
store the surplus, the latter being the starting 
point for the vital growth of reproductive ac-
cumulation, which will subsequently open the 
way to a structural policy. We must not, how-
ever, fall into tempting illusions. Conjunctural 
measures are an urgent requirement. But they 
cannot serve as a substitute for a longer-term 
policy aimed at gradually correcting the ten-
dency towards structural imbalances. 
We noted elsewhere that the conjunctural 
policy is a matter which depends on our own 
decisions. Nevertheless, the co-operation of 
the centres would be of great importance in this 
respect. It is true that —jaded as they are by 
their own problems— they could hardly be ex-
pected to take a very different view from the 
very narrow one which they have displayed so 
far. There are urgent measures which they 
should take, however, especially as regards the 
external debt of the countries of the periphery. 
In spite of the seriousness of the problem, 
the broad solutions of elementary precaution 
which are called for if we are to avoid a ruinous 
financial collapse have not yet been achieved 
at the international level. 
This must form the starting point for mea-
sures designed to support the domestic reacti-
vation of the periphery. The policy of limiting 
imports will be very difficult in some cases, and 
until such time as it begins to show its effects 
the IMF could play a valuable and timely role 
by helping to reconcile the growth of employ-
ment with external equilibrium. 
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III 
The structural tendency towards domestic imbalance 
As we have already noted, the exclusive and 
conflictive tendency of development derives 
from structural factors whose manifestations 
are aggravated by conjunctural problems. No 
matter how much we try to attack these prob-
lems with measures such as those just men-
tioned, the effects of these measures will be 
limited by imbalances of a structural nature 
which call for thorough-going changes. Let us 
now consider the tendency towards domestic 
imbalance, by raising some important queries 
in order to guide our discussions. 
Why is it that the great disparities in the 
structural distribution of income cannot be cor-
rected beyond certain limits? Why does social 
or distributive inflation occur when these li-
mits are passed? Why does monetary policy 
become ineffective and counterproductive? 
Inequality is and essential element in the 
dynamics of peripheral capitalism, since the 
surplus from which the accumulation of re-
productive capital derives depends primarily 
on this. At the same time, however, the surplus 
stimulates the privileged consumption of the 
upper strata. 
Thus, the upper social strata, which have 
most of the means of production in their hands, 
appropriate a large part of the increase in pro-
ductivity of the system, the fruits of which are 
only transferred to a small extent to the labour 
force, because of the heterogeneity of the social 
structure. This structure displays great dispar-
ities of productivity due to the different de-
grees of penetration of technology, so that those 
employed at the lower levels of technology and 
income are competing with others employed in 
higher-productivity strata, thus making it dif-
ficult to achieve an improvement in their wages 
with respect to the latter. 
That part of the increased productivity 
which is not thus transferred to the labour 
force remains in the hands of the owners of the 
means of production in the form of a surplus, 
because of their power of appropriation. 
At the same time, in the course of the struc-
tural changes the trade union and political 
power of the labour force gradually increases, 
thus enabling it to share in the fruits of greater 
productivity through higher wages. The growth 
rate of the latter cannot exceed the growth rate 
of productivity, however, without causing dis-
turbances in the system. This is not subject to 
any regulatory principle. 
This is where the monetary instruments 
are of great significance. They have a dual ob-
jective: to make possible the appropriation of 
the surplus and to defend it from the attempts 
to bring about its redistribution. Money is very 
far from being neutral, as is often claimed. On 
the contrary, it is a decisive element in social 
inequality. The theory of the neutrality of mon-
ey merely stems from reluctance to recognize 
the social structure and the changes in it. 
In order to understand this matter it is ne-
cessary to explain the monetary requirements 
of unfinished production. In the evolution of 
the latter, the production of final goods de-
velops more rapidly than that of the employ-
ment which gives rise to it and the correspond-
ing income, thanks to rising productivity. Con-
sequently, if the demand for such goods came 
only from this income, prices would go down in 
proportion as productivity rose. In reality, how-
ever, demand does not result from such in-
come previously paid in the course of the pro-
duction of such goods, but from the larger in-
come resulting from the as yet unfinished pro-
duction of a larger quantity of goods which will 
subsequenty come on to the market. Thus, the 
demand arising from this larger income pre-
vents prices from going down. 
The monetary authorities play an impor-
tant role in this, since enterprises turn to the 
banking system in order to secure the expan-
sion of the money supply with which to pay the 
income of the labour force. This expansion per-
mits the enterprises to retain and increase the 
surplus. The surplus is of a structural nature, 
whereas its appropriation is of a monetary 
nature. 
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What happens when wages increase? The 
answer is that in order to meet this increase the 
enterprises will need to increase the flow of 
money which they had previously had at their 
disposal. If they succeed in doing so, then de-
mand will rise. Thus, a moment will come 
when, thanks to the redistributive pressure, 
wages will exceed the increase in productivity, 
and the greater demand thus generated will 
cause prices to rise. 
This rise in prices restores the growth of 
the surplus, which had been flagging to the 
extent that the higher wages had increased the 
labour force's share in the fruits of productivi-
ty. 
Before we go any further with this line of 
reasoning it should be explained that the la-
bour force is not only struggling for higher 
wages but also seeks, When it has sufficient 
trade union and political power, to offset the 
factors which have adversely affected its real 
income, the most important of diese being the 
taxes and other .charges levied by the State, 
which fall on the labour force's shoulders in 
one way or another, in response to them, the 
labour force seeks to recover the lost ground 
through an increase in wages. To the extent that 
it succeeds in gaining such an increase, it in-
creases the tendency of wages to exceed the 
rate of growth of productivity. It is hardly sur-
prising, then, that in such conditions taxes or 
other charges become a source of inflation. 
The same occurs with other factors of do-
mestic and above all external origin which, by 
reducing real wages, give rise to this action of 
seeking compesation. 
The system lacks a mechanism which 
would enable it to deal equitably with these 
adverse effects on wages. In all this there is a 
bias in favour of the upper strata, which obtain 
a considerable part of the fruits of technical 
progress. When the labour force tries to gain a 
bigger share of these fruits beyond the limits 
mentioned, or to offset the adverse effects on its 
income, the system reacts with a rise in prices, 
thus restoring the growth of the surplus and the 
capacity for privileged consumption. 
Whatever happens, every time that the la-
bour force gains sufficient power in the course 
of the democratization process this means that 
every increase in prices is necessarily followed 
by a rise in wages, in the all too well-known 
inflationary spiral, and the surplus swells and 
contracts alternately, to die detriment of its 
growth-producing role. 
What can the monetary authorities do to 
check this spiral? They must not resort to any 
of the actions which it was possible to carry 
out in previous stages of structural evolution, 
when the labour force lacked power or was 
only just beginning to gain influence. If an 
attempt is made to repeat this approach in 
later stages, the consequences are counterpro-
ductive. 
In those earlier days, the monetary author-
ities could simply refuse to grant firms a larger 
supply of money to pay the increased wages. 
This brought with it recession or contraction, 
with consequent unemployment. The unem-
ployment eventually compressed wages, and 
the labour force was then not only compelled to 
retreat from what would otherwise have repre-
sented a real improvement, but also to bear the 
burden of the fiscal taxes and charges which fall 
upon it, as well as the other internal or external 
adverse factors referred to earlier. 
Let us reflect on what all this means. The 
labour force had to compress its consumption 
in this way in order to restore the surplus: not 
only the surplus a» a source of accumulation, 
but also as the element making possible the 
privileged consumption of the upper strata. 
Those who believe that the free play of 
market forces tends towards distributive equity 
justify the drop in real wages by claiming that 
this merely corrects the harmful consequences 
of the violation of the market laws by the trade 
union and political power of the labour force, 
which they considered to be abusive. Of course 
they overlook the appropriation and retention 
of die surplus by the upper strata, which pre-
vents the spontaneous social diffusion of the 
fruits of technical progress. 
When the trade union and political power 
of the labour force is vigorous, however, and 
resists the drop in wages, a singular phenom-
enon of our days takes place: a rise in wages 
takes place side by side with recession or con-
traction of the economy. This is explained by 
the fact that the restrictive monetary policy 
obliges enterprises to divert part of their mone-
tary flow to the payment of higher wages, to the 
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detriment of the growth of employment and of 
production in progress. 
Unshakeable faith in restrictive policies 
leads some persons to advocate their persistent 
application until the labour force is completely 
mastered. Even if this took place and wages fell 
because of unemployment, however, the suc-
cess would only be momentary, because with 
the subsequent improvement of employment 
the labour force would recover its trade union 
and political power and would again begin to 
exert pressure for higher wages. What use would 
the heavy economic and social cost of this poli-
cy then have been? 
Monetary policy is also counterproductive 
when it is used to compensate for the creation 
of money caused by the fiscal deficit, which 
lpads to a contraction in the amount of money 
available for the needs of private activity. If 
instead of this a more orthodox procedure is 
followed and recourse is had to taxes, the con-
sequences are also adverse. If the costs fall 
upon the labour force and the latter has suffi-
cient power to gain compensation for them, the 
taxes become inflationary, as already noted. And 
if they fall upon the upper strata, they have a 
negative effect on the accumulation of capital. 
There is yet another possible expedient: at-
tracting public saving by raising interest rates, 
for which purpose bank interest rates are also 
raised, through credit restrictions. If this is 
done, then in the best of cases, even if it proves 
possible to reduce the fiscally generated infla-
tion, this will only be achieved at the cost of 
compressing the global product and employ-
ment, as in the previous case. 
Raising interest rates obviates the flight of 
resources to the exterior; moreover, in order to 
obtain Eurocurrency credits it is usual to place 
severer restrictions on credit in order to make 
these operations attractive. 
This attraction of external resources ob-
viously has inflationary consequences which 
counteract the domestic effects of the credit 
restrictions, as well as making the cost of work-
ing capital of enterprises excessively high and 
thus further accentuating the ill-effects. What is 
to be done, then, in order to contain price rises? 
The answer in the view of some, is simply to 
resort to overvaluation of the currency in order 
to stimulate competition from imports, to the 
detriment of domestic production and exports. 
The effects of these monetary manipulations 
carried out under the aegis of the laws of the 
market are too well known for us to spend more 
time on them. 
In short, although monetary orthodoxy 
and fiscal orthodoxy were effective in other 
times, they have now ceased to be so; the mone-
tary authority has been knocked off his throne. 
This is the consequence of the changes which 
have taken place in the social structure as the 
technology of the centres has penetrated and 
the power relations have changed. 
It will thus be understood that for those 
who attribute inflation to the trade union and 
political power of the labour force, it seems 
necessary to eliminate this power by inter-
rupting the process of democratization and at 
the same time dismantling the State apparatus 
in order to make it "subsidiary". It cannot be 
denied that the restoration of the surplus in this 
way could have positive dynamic effects if the 
accumulation potential were devoted to pro-
ductive investments. If this were done, it 
would gradually eliminate the exclusive ten-
dencies of the system. Unfortunately, however, 
this has proved to be a tragic illusion, for in the 
very far from austere capitalism of the periph-
ery, the restoration of the surplus flagrantly fa-
vours the privileged consumer society rather 
than the accumulation of reproductive capital. 
There is no doubt in the minds of some that 
the use of the power of the State to compress 
wages can reduce domestically generated in-
flation. If such inflation continues, it is main-
tained, this is because the budget deficit per-
sists, even though in these circumstances fiscal 
orthodoxy once more comes into its own. Other 
factors which frequently influence this state of 
affairs are the abuse of consumer credits or in-
vestments, or international inflation. In reality, 
the objective has usually proved to be not so 
much that of checking inflation as restoring the 
surplus through this compression of wages. 
Once this objective has been achieved, infla-
tion once again becomes tolerable to the dom-
inant groups, provided that the periodic ad-
justments of wages do not prejudice the sur-
plus. 
The power of the State is used in favour of 
the upper strata. This statement calls for an 
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explanation, because these strata include both 
productive entrepreneurs and financial entre-
preneurs. An excessive rise in domestic in-
terest rates over international rates consider-
ably increases the power of the second group, 
and thus gives rise to an unusual dichotomy. 
On the one hand, the compression of real wages 
makes it possible to restore the surplus and 
favour productive capital, but on the other hand 
a frequently substantial part of die surplus is 
transferred to the benefit of the financial 
groups, thus strengthening their political 
weight. It can therefore be seen that the raising 
of interest rates is much more than a simple 
technocratic aberration. 
The foregoing discussion on the inef-
fectiveness of monetary policy for containing 
the inflationary spiral leads us to emphasize the 
structural nature of the phenomena, which are 
beyond the reach of such policy in the course of 
the structural changes. 
These changes and the changes in the pow-
er relations which accompany them increas-
ingly tend towards a crisis of inflation. In reali-
ty, the crisis is a consequence of the inner logic 
of peripheral capitalism, which does not obey 
any regulatory principle in the distributive 
struggle. The counterpart of this struggle lies in 
the changes undergone by the social composi-
tion of consumption. 
The increase in the private and social con-
sumption of the labour force and the civil and 
military consumption of the State (and in its 
non-productive investments) do not take place 
at the expense of the privileged consumption of 
the favoured social groups, but are superim-
posed on it. Thus, the pressure of the labour 
force and of the State inevitably moves towards 
The rate of development of the periphery is 
limited not only by the insufficient accumula-
tion of reproductive capital, as we have just 
explained, but also by the tendency to structu-
ral imbalance with the centres, with which we 
shall now deal. 
a structural imbalance between the rate of con-
sumption and the rate of accumulation of ca-
pital. 
It will be understood, then, that although 
the crisis of the system is inflationary, it does 
not permit monetary solutions, as was possible 
in earlier phases of the structural evolution. 
As already noted, monetary instruments 
are essential in the appropriation of the surplus 
and also in its defence, when that structural 
imbalance takes place. Their economic and so-
cial cost is considerable, however, since this 
defence requires unemployment in order to 
break the power of the labour force and make it 
shoulder all die consequences of the deficit: a 
solution which is not only not a real solution 
but also could not possibly last for any length of 
time. 
Nothing lasting can be achieved without a 
rational transformation of the system in order 
to secure the macroeconomic regulation of the 
distribution of the fruits of technical progress, 
consumption and accumulation through pro-
per planning of the use of the surplus. It should 
clearly be understood that it is not a question of 
restricting global consumption, but of changing 
its social composition. It is necessary to restrict 
it, it is true, in the privileged groups, so as to 
raise the rate of accumulation of reproductive 
capital and thus increase the consumption of 
the unemployed and of the strata of lower pro-
ductivity. This could not result from the mar-
ket forces, but only from changes of great 
structural significance. There is no contradic-
tion between these changes and the market. On 
the contrary, they could improve its economic 
efficiency and give it the social efficiency 
which it now largely lacks. 
This imbalance stems essentially from the 
historical lag in the development of the periph-
ery, which, in turn, is explained by the centri-
petal nature of advanced capitalism. 
Because of this centripetal nature, the cen-
tres are not interested in the achievement by 
IV 
The structural imbalance with the centres 
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the periphery of development with deep social 
features; its development only affects them to 
the extent that it suits their own development, 
generally regarded from the viewpoint of the 
interests of their enterprises. 
Such a downright statement calls for some 
justification. It is to be explained primarily by 
the centripetal dynamics of capitalism in the 
advanced countries. In the final analysis, this 
dynamics comes from a persistent phenome-
non in the development of the centres, where 
the fruits of their technical progress have been 
ratained throughout their historical evolution. 
No matter how these fruits may be distributed 
within the centres, they are in no case passed 
on to the periphery through the lowering of 
prices. For better or for worse, capitalism has 
never functioned as conventional theories as-
sume. 
This fact has had and continues to have 
profound consequences; in effect, the increase 
in the global product through unceasing in-
creases in productivity gives rise to the expan-
sion of demand within the centres themselves 
and continually stimulates the technical in-
novations which diversify goods and services. 
Likewise, these increases in productivity per-
mit a considerable accumulation of capital in 
order to pay for all this. Thus, technical pro-
gress and industrialization have been concen-
trated in the advanced countries, leaving to the 
periphery the ancillary role of providing them 
with raw materials, with which the periphery 
pays from its imports of the manufactures it 
needs. 
This is a very well known fact, but its con-
sequences have not always been grasped in 
their true significance. To begin with, the pe-
riphery remained on the sidelines of indus-
trialization in the early development of capi-
talism and has since participated in the indus-
trial trade of the centres only to a very limited 
extent. The periphery has not ceased to be pe-
ripheral, in spite of its industrialization. It has» 
still not been able to incorporate itself into the 
impressive technological advance of the cen-
tres. It is towards this goal that the progressive 
transformation of its production structure must 
be oriented. 
The industrialization of the periphery was 
a structural requirement for development, al-
though it was initiated for conjunctural reasons 
mainly during the Great Depression, in order 
to counter the adverse consequences of the 
economic contraction in the exterior. And it 
had necessarily to be carried out through im-
port substitution. It could not be otherwise as 
long as the international system of trade and 
payments was split up. 
It was a structural requirement, because 
the exports ofprimary commodities could only 
absorb a relatively small part of the consider-
able proportion of the labour force which was 
excluded from the benefits of development. 
There can be no doubt that if there had 
been any possibility of exporting manufac-
tures, this should have been done at the same 
time as substitution, in those early days of in-
dustrial development. When this possibility 
did arise, however, there was generally reluc-
tance to embark on exports, or even outright 
opposition to them: such was the inertia of sub-
stitution policy. 
This inertia was finally overcome in the 
long period of extraordinary growth rates of the 
centres, which lasted up to the first half of the 
1970s. It was then that the pendulum swung to 
the other extreme, as already noted. There was 
noteworthy growth of exports of manufac-
tures, while import substitution and the policy 
of developing trade in manufactures in the La-
tin America region lost momentum. 
This occurred in spite of the fact that the 
centres continued their determined protection-
ism against the manufactures which the periph-
ery was now in a position to export just like 
its primary commodities. In contrast, the cen-
tres engaged in an intense process of liberaliza-
tion of their industrial trade with each other 
over the whole wide range of goods which were 
continually being diversified through techno-
logical innovation. 
Thus, just as the periphery had previously 
remained on the sidelines of industrialization, 
it was now barely able to participate in the 
flourishing mutual trade of those boom times 
of the centres. It was still far from being able to 
take advantage of the innovations of the centres 
in its own production, except in the case of a 
few goods where the innovations were no longer 
novel, since they had been overtaken by newer 
ideas. 
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It will be understood, then, that now that 
these times are over and the crisis of the centres 
has arrived, we are once again witnessing the 
persistent tendency towards structural imbal-
ance. This tendency is explained by the rela-
tive slowness with which demand tends to rise 
in the centres for the primary commodities and 
industrial goods which the periphery could ex-
port on a large scale, in contrast with the ever-
increasing intensity of the demand for the 
technologically advanced goods which we need 
to import from the centres. 
Our own rate of development is now suf-
fering the unfavourable consequences of the 
crisis which is affecting the centres. The 
growth rate of exports has suffered, and they are 
now insufficient to enable us to recover our 
growth rate and combat unemployment, while 
even less can we dream of raising this rate in 
order to absorb at a rising level of productivity 
the great human masses which have remained 
relegated to the bottom of the social structure. 
Without prejudice to the conjunctural 
measures already mentioned, it is essential to 
impart new vigour to the substitution policy, 
while however seeking to overcome the frag-
mentation of our industrial process through 
trade. It is not a question of reducing the im-
ports from the centres below our capacity to 
pay for them, but rather of bringing them into 
line with the limitations of this capacity by 
changing their composition and eliminating 
from them those goods where we have already 
achieved or could achieve technological pro-
duction capacity, so as to import other goods 
which, because of their advanced technologi-
cal nature or because of our shortage of natu-
ral resources, are beyond our possibilities in 
our present stage of industrial development. 
Here we arrive at a very important aspect 
which is worth emphasizing because it contin-
ues to give rise to lamentable misunderstand-
ings. For a given rate of development of the 
periphery, the intensity of substitution policy 
depends fundamentally on the extent to which 
the centres respond to a sustained export effort 
on our part: that is to say, on their own growth 
rate and on the intensity of their protection-
ism. Expressed in more recent terms we could 
say that the rational degree of openness of the 
periphery does not depend so much on its own 
decisions as on the degree of openness of the 
centres. 
The old principle of comparative advan-
tages remains valid. From every point of view, 
it would be in the interests of the periphery to 
make a vigorous effort to export technologically 
less advanced goods in order to import other 
technologically more advanced products. This 
depends fundamentally, however, on the de-
gree of receptiveness of the centres. When we 
only exported primary commodities, there 
could not be any comparative advantages in the 
export of manufactures, because there were 
simply no industries for producing them. Now 
that we are in a position to do so, however, the 
limited receptiveness of the centres is a serious 
obstacle to the development of our compara-
tive advantages. 
Development therefore calls for big changes 
in the production structure, and the question 
of whether these changes place the emphasis 
on industrialization for export as well as for 
satisfying domestic consumption, or on pro-
duction for domestic consumption instead of 
promoting imports depends in the final analy-
sis on the amount of our exports that the centres 
are willing to admit: that is to say, on our 
capacity for absorbing imports from the centres. 
In view of the limited nature of this capacity to 
import, we must use it in the best possible 
manner so as to make the changes in our pro-
duction structure which are in keeping with the 
dynamics of our own development. There is no 
question, then, of doing without the centres, 
since we need an enormous quantity of goods 
from them, as well as capital and technology, 
just as they need the periphery. But we must 
link ourselves with them in line with the re-
quirements of our own dynamics and in keep-
ing with our own decisions. This cannot be the 
spontaneous result of the action of the laws of 
the international market, where the technical 
and economic superiority of foreign enter-
prises is all too manifest. 
The historical lag in our industrialization, 
because of the centripetal dynamics of ad-
vanced capitalism and our technical and eco-
nomic inferiority, prevented us in earlier times 
from developing our industrialization, and it is 
now preventing us from advancing in it unless 
there is reasonable protection for import substi-
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tutes and a corresponding subsidy to promote 
exports of manufactures. There can be no doubt 
that this represents an economic cost, but it is 
more than offset by the fact that it makes possi-
ble a higher growth rate of the product than that 
which would result from the application of the 
laws of the market at the international level. 
The belief has been spread around that it is 
better to seek this objective through devalua-
tion of the currency within the play of the laws 
of the market. Devaluation is fully justified in 
order to take account of domestic inflation, but 
it is not a suitable instrument for industrial 
promotion, since it brings with it the relative 
deterioration of the prices of competitive ex-
ports. Moreover, it means altering all domestic 
costs and prices in order to influence a small 
proportion of foreign trade, while its effects 
can only be of short duration, because of the 
adjustments called for by the distributive 
struggle. 
It is worth remembering that this deterio-
ration has a structural explanation. It is due to 
the disparities in demand which go hand in 
hand with our backward level of development 
and have a decisive influence on the produc-
tive structure of the periphery. These dispari-
ties, in turn, are due to the great structural dif-
ferences with the centres. This is why indus-
trialization is indispensable. In earlier times it 
was thought —and there are some who continue 
to think this under the domination of the 
centres— that instead of industrializing to the 
full it would be better to increase productivity 
in primary activities. But what is to be done 
with the labour force which can no longer be 
absorbed by those activities? If it is used to 
increase primary production beyond the pur-
chasing capacity of the external market, a ten-
dency to a relative deterioration in prices will 
soon be shown. Industrialization is the prime 
form of avoiding this or at least reducing its 
seriousness. Protection, just like subsidies, 
helps to offset this tendency by diverting pro-
ductive resources to industry. 
A great contrast should be noted here. 
Whereas the centres retain the fruits of their 
technical progress, the periphery tends to 
transfer them because of its social heterogene-
ity and the disparities in the income elasticity 
of demand. 
This tendency towards deterioration which 
is so adverse to the development of the periph-
ery suits the interests of the centres, of course. 
Deterioration in otiier countries suits them, but 
not when it is in their own countries, because 
when it affects their own primary production 
they take resolute action to combat this ten-
dency. 
We noted earlier that the tendency to struc-
tural imbalance with the centres has once again 
begun to manifest itself with the adverse ef-
fects of the drop in their growth rate, aggra-
vated by the high prices of petroleum imports. 
Moreover, as already noted, important con junc-
tural elements are in action in the centres, to 
which the periphery must reply with a similar-
ly conjunctural policy. A clear distinction must 
be drawn, however, between this policy and 
the structural need to undertake a new policy of 
substitution of imports from the centres. The 
imports mainly concerned are intermediate 
and capital goods and certain goods resulting 
from technological innovations which are or 
could be accessible to us. 
For economic and technological reasons, 
it is essential that this substitution should take 
place in a broader area than that of national 
markets. The centres have not favoured this 
type of co-operation among Latin American 
countries, and much less with other countries 
of the periphery. It is conceivable, however, 
that their enterprises might be interested in 
viewing it more favourably and in participating 
in this new and promising stage of industrial-
ization of the periphery with their capital and 
technology, in line with suitable rules. Ob-
viously, if they are given the choice between 
continuing to export certain goods and partici-
pating in their substitution, they will choose 
the first of these. But if there is firm determina-
tion on the part of our countries to formulate 
and put into practice substitution programmes 
aimed at broad markets, it is possible that the 
centres will not waste the opportunity to take 
part in this. The support of the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the World Bank would 
likewise be very important in this. As far as I 
can remember, the recent economic report of 
the latter organization represents the first time 
that it has mentioned the need for a substitution 
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policy and for the promotion of exports of manu-
factures. 
It is necessary to take a broad view of these 
possibilities. These new forms of industrial-
ization concerted between countries could 
constitute a very important step forward in our 
gradual incorporation into trade in technologi-
cally advanced goods with the centres. It 
should be remembered that import substitu-
tion was the prior step to the subsequent ex-
port of manufactures. Undertaking new forms 
of substitution and mutual trade within the 
Latin American area —without prejudice to 
certain trade possibilities with other countries 
of the Third World— could form the basis for 
this new type of international linkage. Substi-
tution industrialization, for ali its faults, re-
presented our response to the Great Depres-
sion. Industrialization in broader markets 
must be our response to the structural mani-
festations of the present crisis. It could be a 
response offering great possibilities, if we 
proceed in a rational and determined manner 
with the firm intention of gradually aban-
doning our position as peripheral countries. 
Up to what point is such an important struc-
tural change justified? Are we not perhaps 
exaggerating the structural nature of the crisis 
in the centres? 
It is necessary at this point to make a brief 
reference to this crisis, which is far from having 
been clarified. I am inclined to see in the crisis 
of the centres, too, a case of structural imbal-
ance between consumption and accumulation, 
due to the considerable changes which the 
power relations have undergone. 
The extraordinary consumption of the 
upper strata tends to spread rapidly down-
wards, and there has been a very marked in-
crease in social consumption through the State. 
The latter also labours under enormous and 
ever-increasing military spending, or, if prefer-
red, military consumption. All these superim-
posed forms of consumption tend to weaken 
the rate of accumulation of reproductive 
capital. 
The continuous growth of such capital is 
essential in order for employment and produc-
tivity to increase. Consequently, this weaken-
ing has had an unfavourable influence in this 
sense, in addition to the effect of conjunctural 
phenomena. 
There has thus been a disturbance of the 
ideal dynamic sequence of the system: in-
creased productivity, greater accumulation, 
followed by a further increase in productivity. 
How are we to restore this dynamic se-
quence? The only solution, in my view, is to 
change the social composition of consumption. 
It is necessary to slow down its growth among 
the most highly privileged —above all in the 
top strata— in order instead to accumulate 
more resources and increase employment and 
productivity so as to expand the consumption of 
the least privileged. 
This is a solution which is apparently very 
simple, but politically very difficult: to such a 
point that extraordinary rises in interest rates 
have been resorted to in order to cover the 
fiscal deficit through saving, while simulta-
neously reducing private consumption in order 
to cover the heavy spending of the State. We 
already know what the consequences of this 
measure are. 
This is not all, however. While on the one 
hand the rate of accumulation of reproductive 
capital has suffered, the substitution of im-
ported petroleum and the campaign against 
degradation of the environment make it essen-
tial to increase capital formation in one way or 
another to meet the bigger capital needs per 
unit of the product. 
I do not see in what other way it would be 
possible to solve this structural crisis. No doubt 
the increase in the rate of productivity thanks to 
technical innovations, which has already be-
gun to be observed, will be a great relief, but it 
also requires increased amounts of capital. 
These considerations lead me to believe 
that the estimates made by very well-informed 
sources that a low growth rate will persist dur-
ing the current decade in both the main growth 
centre and in the other centres are probably 
very sound. 
And if these estimates turned out to be 
mistaken? Would we have gone too far with 
changes in our production structure, and would 
we have to go back on the road we have follow-
ed? By no means: it would merely be necessary 
to reduce the intensity ofnew changes aimed at 
the domestic market and increase the orienta-
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tion towards the exterior. In other words, we 
should practice a certain policy of greater open-
ness on the basis of facts and not through the 
imposition of doctrines which completely over-
look structural disparities between our coun-
tries and the centres. 
V 
Reflections on the search for a new road to development 
We must face up to serious conjunctural prob-
lems without having solved the great structural 
problems of our development. We have gener? 
ally lost sight of the latter during the boom 
phases of the economic cycle, when some re-
sources were available to set about their solu-
tion, but they have arisen once again in the 
phases of depression, when it is much more 
difficult to undertake profound changes. 
This is what is happening now, with the 
further aggravation that rather than a cyclical 
downturn in the centres the situation is one of a 
structural decline in the growth rate. This fact, 
together with other adverse factors, means that 
there are external structural limits on any reac-
tivation policy, as well as the internal limits. 
Be that as it may, the conjunctural reacti-
vation policy must be fitted into a structural 
framework in order to intertwine certain im-
mediate measures with others which will take 
longer to bear fruit. 
The structural problem of the insufficient 
productive absorption of the great relegated 
masses is aggravated by conjunctural unem-
ployment, above all in those countries which, 
through their own policies, have provoked a 
contraction in their economic activity, with 
very serious social consequences. This is a very 
important reason for not putting the reactiva-
tion off any longer. 
If it is not to bring about a perilous accen-
tuation of the tendency to external imbalance, 
the reactivation calls for severe containment 
measures. We have unfortunately not yet arriv-
ed at really large-scale solutions as regards 
external indebtedness, and here the reactiva-
tion policy runs into a severe stumbling block. 
It is urgently necessary for the IMF and the 
World Bank to take this matter resolutely in 
hand by extending repayment terms and re-
ducing interest rates, even through subsidies. 
The balance-of-payments difficulties would 
thus become more manageable and permit the 
reactivation to be more extensive. Moreover, 
improvement of the capacity to receive new 
long-term external resources would give a posi-
tive impulse to programmes aimed at correct-
ing the external structural imbalance. 
From the internal point of view, the reacti-
vation calls for the readjustment of the debts 
with the banking system as a matter of top prio-
rity, especially in the case of certain economic 
activities which have suffered particularly se-
riously because of the overvaluation of curren-
cy and the very high rates of interest. Time 
should be given to react, but only provided that 
these and other emergency measures are taken 
first. 
In addition to certain selective import 
measures it is necessary to introduce a policy 
aimed at correcting the external imbalance of a 
structural nature. This calls for the energetic 
promotion of exports and the substitution of 
imports from the centres within larger spaces 
than the national markets. Private enterprises, 
and where appropriate the State enterprises 
too, are well equipped to do so in a harmonious 
manner together. 
Anti-inflationary policy must also be car-
ried out within a structural framework. Even if 
it is possible to reach consensus on an incomes 
policy, this will be socially vulnerable if we do 
not tackle in some way the problem of the eco-
nomic surplus and its macroeconomic regula-
tion. The surplus must be restored and increa-
sed in order to raise the rate of accumulation of 
reproductive capital, butthis could not be done 
by making all the burden fall on the labour 
force. I have been repeatedly bringing in this 
matter in order to try to spark off the unavoid-
able discussion on this point. The labour force 
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must share in the surplus and in the responsi-
bility for accumulation. 
By way of conclusion, I would like to reiter-
ate that in the past days of great prosperity of the 
advanced countries we did not clearly see the 
centripetal nature of their dynamics. The Latin 
American periphery, too, had extraordinary 
growth rates which had not previously been re-
gistered over such a long period. We therefore 
allowed ourselves to be dazzled, without fully 
realizing that our development did not interest 
the centres except to the extent that it suited 
their own needs, and the concern felt in earlier 
periods about the tendency towards external 
imbalance drifted away. In the correction of this 
tendency, the periphery has a fundamental re-
sponsibility. It must take advantage of the ex-
perience provided by a past which is still not so 
far off. 
Our exports of manufactures began to show 
their potential, and we cherished the illusion, 
which is now rapidly fading, that there would 
be unlimited receptiveness for them on the part 
of the centres. Import substitution fell into sin-
gular disrepute, discouraging integration ef-
forts even of a modest nature. It is quite true 
that the centres built up a very vigorous mutual 
trade in manufactured goods. The products in-
volved, however, were new goods or new mo-
dels of goods incessandy developed by suc-
cesive technological innovations, and they 
were far from the reach of the Latin American 
periphery. It is in this type of goods that the 
comparative advantages of the centres lie: in 
opening up new fields of advanced industrial-
ization and producing ahd trading every type of 
goods for which demand grew at an unusually 
rapid rate, urged on by these innovations and 
by the mass media. But the centres did not 
acknowledge and still do not acknowledge the 
advantages of the periphery as regards the pro-
duction of those goods which, by virtue of the 
periphery's resources and the technology ac-
quired by it, enable it to compete on an increas-
ingly large scale in the markets of the centres. 
What a strange contradiction between the facts 
and the much-vaunted virtues of comparative 
advantages! 
The old tendency towards external imba-
lance of a structural nature has once again 
arisen, and the centres have done nothing 
worthy of note to co-operate with us to correct 
this situation. 
Furthermore, those times of great prosper-
ity accentuated to an impressive degree the 
imitative aspects of our development. We en-
thusiastically brought in the forms of consump-
tion of the advanced countries, to the clear det-
riment of the accumulation of reproductive 
capital, which was also adversely affected by 
the relentless siphoning-off of income from the 
periphery by the centres. 
The fate of the great masses of human 
beings relegated to the bottom of the social 
structure urgently called for an increase in the 
rate of accumulation of reproductive capital in 
order to raise their very low productivity and 
their scanty income, to say nothing of their dig-
nity as human beings. We did not effectively 
attack the exclusive tendencies of the system in 
a manner in keeping with the magnitude of the 
problem and the rapid population growth. 
After we had only gone a short way along 
our own road to industrialization, it became 
evident that the laws of the market, no matter 
how great their contribution to economic ef-
ficiency might be, did not lead to social effi-
ciency. The spontaneous operation of the sys-
tem is far from bringing about an equitable dis-
tribution of the fruits of technical progress, 
since this is prevented by the structural appro-
priation of a large part of these fruits by the 
upper strata. 
On the other hand, as the process of demo-
cratization took place, the redistributive power 
of the labour force was gradually taking shape 
and acting as a counterweight to this power of 
appropriation of the economic surplus. This 
was essential in order to correct the fundamen-
tal inequality of the system, as also was the 
redistributive power of the State. With all its 
faults, the results were frankly favourable: 
there was a substantial improvement in the pri-
vate and social consumption of the labour force, 
which was being absorbed in employment of 
rising productivity, although the presence of 
socially relegated masses at the bottom of the 
system continued. 
This improvement and the growth of the 
State were superimposed however, on the pri-
vileged consumption of the upper strata. This 
process of sharing did not obey any regulatory 
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principle whatsoever. It did not owe anything 
to the free play of the market forces, in spite of 
the theories which claim that there is an under-
lying equity in their functioning. 
This superimposition of different forms of 
consumption has gradually weakened the rate 
of accumulation of reproductive capital, al-
though not of other forms of capital which lack 
the dynamic virtue of multiplying employment 
and productivity. This structural tendency to 
imbalance between consumption and invest-
ment culminates, through the inherent inner 
logic of the system, in persistent social infla-
tion, where monetary policy inevitably runs 
into disastrous difficulties. It is simply not pos-
sible to substitute such a policy for structural 
changes which go to the very root of the conflic-
tive tendencies in die system. 
The centripetal nature of advanced capital-
ism is the principal source of the backwardness 
of our development, our economic and techno-
logical inferiority, and the economic fragmen-
tation of the periphery. These are the condi-
tions which have shaped both the past hege-
mony of advanced capitalism and the new man-
ifestations of this hegemony. Certain theories 
which have been disseminated and continue to 
be disseminated on the periphery correspond 
to this. Whatever their scientific bases may 
have been in other times, they are now merely 
an expression of the fundamental lack of inter-
est of the centres in anything which does not 
suit their own development. 
So it was with the former system of the 
international division of labour, which is con-
trary to our planned industrialization. The in-
sistence on this system also led the centres to 
deny that there is a tendency for the periphery 
to transfer to the centres the fruits of the techni-
cal progress in its own primary production: a 
tendency which only industrialization can 
counteract. It also explains their opposition to 
import substitution, until the trans nationals 
found sources of advantage in this. 
These transnational corporations were not, 
of course, an effective and decisive instrument 
of internationalization of peripheral produc-
tion, as they generally pretended to be, but 
were rather agents for the internationalization 
of imitative consumption. Now, in more recent 
times, the periphery has fallen back incautious-
ly into a macroeconomic design involving the 
reduction of industrialization in favour of gene-
rous stimulation of imports, mostly of consumer 
goods, on the basis of the precarious resources 
provided by the Eurocurrency market. 
What are we to say of the policy of econom-
ic contraction as a means of counteracting the 
external imbalance? 
It should be understood that these and 
other lines of thought were promoted from 
other latitudes. But do those who have adopted 
them so enthusiastically on the periphery real-
ize what they signify and involve for our devel-
opment? 
This is another of the flagrant manifesta-
tions of the hegemony of the centres: the intel-
lectual dependence of the periphery. Please 
allow me to make a personal admission at this 
point. In those far-off days when I was a young 
man, I felt positive reverence for the economic 
theories of the centres. I began to lose this 
during the depression, however, and I have 
continued to lose it, so that very litde of it re-
mains. The centres are no longer a model for 
me. On the contrary, I think I have acquired an 
acute critical sense regarding what they do and 
think, for the impressive advance registered in 
other scientific disciplines has not yet reached 
that of the theories of development, caught as 
they are in the musty toils of the thinking of 
over a century ago. 
How could I feel otherwise, when during 
the great depression I witnessed so many tre-
mendous erros? In the main centre of capital-
ism, in the midst of a cyclical decline, the 
authorities brutally restricted credit and drasti-
cally increased protectionism, bringing eco-
nomic contraction and unemployment to the 
entire world. Nothing was left at mat time of the 
multilateral system of trade and payments, 
whose reconstruction was to last for many 
years. 
All this must sound like a picture from 
other ages. The years of prosperity came, and 
we began to believe that we had really finally 
learned to regulate the economy of the centres. 
Until the present crisis in the centres rocked 
the entire world. This crisis does not represent 
the decadence of capitalism, but rather the 
unsuspected overflowing of its great vigour. 
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We have not yet found new channels for con-
taining it. 
This is a crisis of facts and of ideas. It was 
not possible to contain this overflow, nor the 
structural imbalances represented by the ex-
pansion of the money supply, which, after be-
ginning in the United States, ended in the form 
of world-wide inflation. It is a structural imbal-
ance which cannot be corrected, any more than 
other problems, through the wild raising of in-
terest rates, which spreads unemployment 
throughout the capitalist world, with serious 
economic, social and political consequences. 
The centres, too, must rectify the course of 
their development, but it does not seem that 
they are willing yet to do so. In spite of all their 
unfortunate consequences, however, crises 
often have the virtue of renewing ideas. I be-
lieve we are now more inclined to take the 
necessary measures, because we have longer 
experience of the great vicissitudes of devel-
opment. I do not believe that orthodox social-
ism is outside this need for renewal either. 
Everywhere the active presence of the State is 
needed: not a subsidiary State, but one that 
regulates and promotes development, although 
not necessarily producing goods. 
The quest for an economic incentive, inas-
much as it spurs the initiative of entreprises 
and individuals, is a powerful generator of ef-
ficiency and growth, but it does not solve the 
serious problems which technology has 
brought with it as regards the environment, 
natural resources and social equity. This is 
where the State has an absolutely fundamental 
role to play, in a manner compatible with the 
market, with its great economic and political 
importance. 
This is not all, however. The economic in-
centive increasingly goes beyond the sphere of 
business and penetrates into areas which it 
should never enter, because it perverts great 
values and degrades human fellowship. 
No matter how effective the enterprise 
may be within the limited sphere of its own 
rationality, in reality it lacks a social and ecolo-
gical horizon. Attaining such a horizon is an 
urgent task in the centres, and much more so on 
the periphery. 
Consensus must go beyond the limited ra-
tionality of the market, for ethical objectives of 
an increasingly pressing nature are arising. 
Technology has an enormous potential for in-
creasing human well-being, and has begun to 
show this in a limited portion of the planet. But 
it is running the imminent risk of losing this 
potential because of the limited rationality I 
spoke about. We must not do away with this 
rationality, but extend it to include those great 
objectives without which development cannot 
achieve true social legitimacy. 
